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This article reviews the various means through which governments
and central banks have sought to guarantee long-run price stability. Finn
Kydland and Mark Wynne argue that monetary regimes or standards can
all be viewed as more or less successful attempts to overcome the well-
known time-consistency problem in monetary policy. The classical gold
standard, which prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, can be interpreted as a monetary policy rule that delivered long-run
price stability. The fiat monetary standard adopted by countries following
the abandonment of gold allows greater discretion on the part of monetary
policymakers and has been characterized by greater long-run price insta-
bility. Countries have tried through a variety of means to regain the benefits
of price stability that prevailed under the earlier gold standard by limiting the
scope for discretionary actions on the part of central bankers. A close anal-
ogy exists between the gold standard and the currency board arrange-
ments proposed for many emerging market economies in recent years.
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for monetary stability through alternative monetary standards,
regimes, or constitutions. Our benchmark regime is a fiat monetary
standard that is managed by a central bank with limited independence.We
use this as the benchmark not because it is ideal but because it has char-
acterized most countries since the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed-
exchange-rate system in 1971 and is a model that many countries seem
to be abandoning in one way or another. This article asks whether a bet-
ter regime is possible.
The problem of monetary stability seems to be greatest under fiat
monetary standards. The alternative to a fiat standard is a commodity
standard of some sort.
1 The best-known example of such a standard is 
the gold standard. We think the gold standard is of interest more as an
example of a rule than as a feasible alternative to current regimes. The
gold standard did deliver price stability over long periods, as we will show,
but it was also subject to a number of problems. The great virtue of the
gold standard was its transparency. Under the gold standard, it was not 
difficult to tell whether the central bank or monetary authority was honor-
ing its commitment to buy and sell gold in unlimited quantities at the
announced price. Transparency also characterizes some other monetary
regimes, in particular hard-exchange-rate pegs in the form of currency
boards. Advocates of inflation targeting as a framework for monetary 
policy cite its transparency as an important argument in its favor.
Pegging to a large country’s currency is feasible for a small country
seeking a stable nominal environment. But what about the large country,
the “peggee”? What rule or regime can a large country such as the United
States, or a large single-currency area such as the euro area of the
European Union, adopt to guarantee long-term price stability? The con-
sensus in the academic literature is that the best guarantor of price stabil-
ity under a fiat standard is institutional design. Specifically, an independent
central bank with a clear mandate for price stability may be the closest we
can come to a rule for monetary policy under a fiat money regime.
2
THE PRICE LEVEL IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1850–2000
Figure 1 plots the price level in a group of countries over the past 
150 years. This period encompasses the classical gold standard period
(generally dated between 1870 and 1914) and the recent fiat money
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1 Under a commodity monetary standard, money consists of, or is backed by, some intrin-
sically valuable commodity, such as gold or silver. Under a fiat monetary standard, money
is intrinsically worthless and is valued only to the extent that holders of money expect to
be able to exchange it for goods and services.
2 A variety of other proposals for monetary stability have been put forward at other times.
Two in particular, by Milton Friedman, are worth mentioning. Friedman (1960) proposed
that the best policy to pursue would be a constant k percent growth rate for some meas-
ure of the money stock. The problem with rules of this sort is that (apart from settling on
a measure of the money stock) financial innovation may mean that over time a constant
growth rate becomes more or less inflationary. Friedman (1969) also proposed that the
optimal policy for the monetary authority to pursue is one that sets the nominal interest
rate equal to zero. This latter proposal, known as the “Friedman Rule,” has been the sub-
ject of a large academic literature. However, despite its popularity among academic econo-
mists, it does not seem to have generated serious interest on the part of central bankers.
Tperiod. The contrast between the price stability that prevailed in most
countries under the gold standard and the instability under fiat standards
is striking. This reflects the fact that under commodity standards (such as
the gold standard), increases in the price level (which were frequently
associated with wars) tended to be reversed, resulting in a price level that
was stable over long periods. No such tendency is apparent under the fiat
standards that most countries have followed since the breakdown of the
gold standard between World War I and World War II.
The distinction between commodity and fiat monetary standards is
probably the most important difference between monetary regimes. Under
a commodity standard—whether gold, silver, some combination of the two,
or something else—the monetary authority or central bank has absolutely
no discretionary authority.Commodity standards are the most binding form
of rule we consider.Since the collapse of the gold standard, no country that
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we are aware of has adhered to a commodity standard.
3 While many cen-
tral banks continue to hold stocks of gold, the market value of these stocks
bears no relation to the outstanding liabilities of the central banks.
4
For part of the post–World War II period, the Bretton Woods system
of fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates provided an alternative nominal
anchor for most of the world. This system collapsed in 1971 and was 
followed by a decade or more of high inflation in most of the world’s ad-
vanced economies and hyperinflation in some emerging market econo-
mies. Since the collapse of Bretton Woods, countries have tried many
routes to price stability, which we review below. In the 1990s, a consensus
emerged in the academic community that one of the most assured routes
to price stability was to grant central banks greater independence from the
political authorities, on the grounds that such independence seems to
deliver better inflation performance at no cost in terms of real activity.This
consensus grew out of the finding of Alesina and Summers (1993) that
countries with independent central banks tended to have lower inflation
and did not pay a price in terms of worse real outcomes. This finding has
since been replicated for a larger number of countries.
5 The greater inde-
pendence that some central banks have been granted has in some cases
been accompanied by the introduction of a formal inflation target, to con-
strain the central bank’s actions and ensure that it remains accountable for
its actions.Many economists argue that the combination of an inflation-tar-
geting strategy for monetary policy and an independent central bank is the
best route to price stability under a fiat monetary standard.
Fixed exchange rates can also be interpreted as an alternative mone-
tary regime. However, in recent years, following the collapse of exchange
rate pegs in Southeast Asia and other regions, fixed-exchange-rate regimes
and exchange rate targeting have fallen out of favor as a strategy for
monetary policy. A significant body of opinion argues that the only feasible
exchange rate regimes for emerging market economies are either pure
floats (where the monetary authorities allow the exchange rate to be fully
determined by market forces) or hard pegs such as a currency board or
outright dollarization.
This article views the various regimes as more or less successful
attempts to resolve the time-consistency problem in monetary policy iden-
tified by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and elaborated upon by Calvo
(1978), Barro and Gordon (1983), and numerous other authors.The adop-
tion of one of these various rules or regimes can be viewed as an attempt
on the part of national monetary authorities to tie their hands, to eliminate
3 There is some controversy about the exact date of the gold standard’s demise. Some
authors put it in 1914, at the outset of World War I, since the attempts to resume con-
vertibility following the end of hostilities all ended in failure. Others put the date in 1931,
when the United States formally abandoned the link between the dollar and gold. And
others put it as late as 1971, when the United States stopped redeeming foreign central
bank holdings of dollars for gold.
4 At the end of 2000, the United States held some 260 million ounces of gold reserves.
Valued at market prices then prevailing (approximately $270 an ounce), these reserves
were worth about $70 billion, while the outstanding stock of money base was $612.7
billion. Indeed, in recent years many central banks have been selling their stocks of gold
and investing the proceeds in alternative (income-generating) assets.
5 See, for example, Cukierman (1992). Banaian, Laney, and Willett (1983) is an early con-
tribution to this literature.the possibility of succumbing to the temptation to inflate their way out of a
short-term crisis. The expectation is that by making such commitments,
policymakers acquire credibility for their commitment to price stability,
thereby creating a more favorable environment for real activity.
THE NEED FOR RULES: TIME INCONSISTENCY IN MONETARY POLICYMAKING
The theoretical potential for time inconsistency arises in any context
in which a policymaker makes decisions so as to maximize some objective
function over time, even if this function is unchanging over time and iden-
tical to that of the private sector. For example, the objective function could
be the preferences of the average or representative household over con-
sumption and leisure today and indefinitely far into the future. In other
words, the source of the time-consistency problem is not preferences that
change over time or preferences on the part of the policymaker that are 
at variance with those of the public. Rather, the problem arises because
the optimal outcome takes into account the effect of future policy on the
private economy’s behavior in all periods between now and then. Once
that future comes about, however, these earlier private-economy actions
are already history, and without a commitment to those earlier decisions
for the upcoming periods, the government in general will realize it can do
better, conditional on that history, by altering the previously determined
policy plan.
Examples of the time-consistency problem are the temptation to tax
capital (physical or human) already accumulated, the temptation to elimi-
nate patent protection on new products once they have been developed,
and the temptation to reduce the value of outstanding government debt by
running a surprisingly high inflation (in the sense that it’s higher than that
implied by the optimal policy determined at a much earlier date and also
higher than the public expected when they purchased the government’s
debt). Of course, rational private-sector decisionmakers are unlikely to be
fooled in this sense more than once or twice.
More formally, consider a government that formulates an optimal
plan for policy actions (denoted by π) for the current and all future periods.
6
Denote the optimal plan chosen at date 0 as {0πt}
∞
t=0 = {0π0, 0π1, 0π2, …},
where 0πt denotes the optimal choice for πt as of date t = 0. At date t = 1,
the government recalculates its optimal plan for the current and all future
periods, and the new plan is denoted {1πt}
∞
t=1 = {1π1, 1π2, 1π3, …}. If the orig-
inal choices for policy remain optimal when the plan is reconsidered one
period later (and the policymaker has not received any new information)—
that is, if 1πt = 0πt for all t ≥ 1—the original plan is time consistent. If the
original plan no longer appears optimal from the point of view of the future
once the future arrives, the original plan is time inconsistent.
Our contention, which follows readily from economic theory, is that
recent proposals to set up alternative institutional arrangements for mone-
tary policy represent attempts to commit against future temptations to
deviate from the optimal policy (through the creation of a monetary union,
the adoption of a currency board to replace the central bank, outright dol-
larization, or the adoption of inflation, money, or exchange rate targeting by
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6 The policy actions π may simply be tax rates or inflation rates or may be functions that
determine tax rates or inflation rates as functions of the state of the economy.a more or less independent central bank). Specifically, these arrange-
ments can be viewed as attempts by governments to tie their hands in
advance, so that when faced with the temptation to surprise the private
sector, they find it difficult to do so.
THE EMPIRICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE TIME-CONSISTENCY 
PROBLEM IN ACCOUNTING FOR INFLATION
Since we use the time-consistency perspective to evaluate various
monetary regimes, it is worth asking whether this perspective can account
quantitatively for the inflation experience of countries that do not follow
rules of one sort or another. Blinder (1998) argues that whatever chance
the time-consistency problem has at explaining the acceleration in inflation
in the United States from the mid-1960s through 1980, it can’t explain the
subsequent stabilization and decline in U.S. inflation. He argues that
...the real-world cure to the alleged “inflation bias” problem did not
come from adopting rigid precommitment (“rules”) or other institutional
changes, as Kydland–Prescott and Barro–Gordon suggested. It came
from determined but discretionary application of tight money. Rather
than seeking short-term gains, central banks paid the price to disinflate.
As in the Nike commercial, they just did it. (Blinder, 1998, 41)
Blinder goes on to argue that
Rarely does society solve a time-consistency problem by rigid pre-
commitment or by creating incentive-compatible compensation schemes
for decisionmakers. Enlightened discretion is the rule.( Blinder, 1998,
49, emphasis added)
Blinder (1999) provides further evidence to support this perspective.
From surveying central bankers on their views about how central banks
acquire credibility, he finds that most believe credibility can only be earned
by building up a good track record. Few central bankers in Blinder’s survey
attribute much importance to theoretical ideas like precommitment or
incentive-compatible contracts.
7
Ireland (1999) makes one of the few attempts to examine the ability
of the time-consistency perspective to account for the evolution of inflation.
He argues that the positive model of time-consistent monetary policy de-
veloped by Barro and Gordon (1983) implies certain long-run restrictions
on the empirical relationship between inflation and unemployment that
cannot be rejected using U.S. data. Specifically, as the natural or long-run
unemployment rate increases, so, too, will the pressure on monetary policy-
makers to use inflation to alleviate unemployment.This is exactly what we
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7 Other recent critics of the importance of the time-consistency problem in accounting for
the evolution of U.S. inflation include DeLong (1997) and Taylor (1997). Both argue that
the key to explaining the acceleration of U.S. inflation in the 1970s and subsequent
deceleration in the 1980s is learning on the part of policymakers about how the economy
works. The acceleration was due to the spread of the belief that there is an exploitable
Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment. The decline in the 1980s
and 1990s was due to policymakers’ growing acceptance of the natural-rate view that
there is no long-run trade-off. This idea—that policymakers’ gradually learning about the
natural-rate hypothesis explains the history of inflation in the United States—is explored
in more detail in Sargent (1999).see in U.S. data for the 1970s. The decline in inflation in the 1980s and
1990s coincided with a decline in the natural rate of unemployment, again
in keeping with the model. The Barro and Gordon model emphasizes the
inflation bias that emerges from the attempt to stabilize output. In many
settings, governments and central banks may succumb to the temptation
to engineer a surprise inflation for other reasons, such as alleviating reve-
nue shortfalls.
8
COMMODITY STANDARDS: GOLD, SILVER, AND BRICKS
The earliest monies were all commodity monies.
9 Over time, precious
metals became the dominant form of commodity money, in particular gold
and silver. A number of characteristics (durability, divisibility, portability,
and so forth) made these metals particularly attractive as media of
exchange. The emergence of the gold standard as the dominant basis for
monetary systems in the late nineteenth century was to some extent an
accident of history. However, the key features of the gold standard that
made it a successful monetary constitution or regime are shared by com-
modity standards more generally. While the gold standard is the best
known of the various commodity standards, there is no reason the back-
ing of the money stock ought to be limited to gold or silver.
10 The basic idea
behind a commodity standard is that the monetary authority or govern-
ment pegs the price of a particular commodity or bundle of commodities
by standing ready to buy or sell units of the commodity or commodity bun-
dles in unlimited quantities at a fixed national currency price.
Determination of the price level under a commodity standard is rela-
tively straightforward.
11 If we let q denote the nominal price at which the
central bank stands willing to buy and sell the commodity backing the cur-
rency and Qm denote the stock of the commodity held by the central bank,
the stock of money outstanding is given by
where 0 <λ≤1 denotes the degree to which the money stock is backed
by the commodity. If λ = 1, the currency is fully backed. Assume that the
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8 There do not appear to have been any attempts to evaluate quantitatively the ability of
the time-consistency problem to account for inflation in countries where revenue raising
may have been the dominant motive for inflation. However, casual inspection of data on
the ratios of government deficits and government debt to GDP for a number of Latin
American countries reveals a strong association with inflation rates, in keeping with the
time-consistency story.
9 See Einzig (1930) for a thorough review of the range of commodities that have served as
money in primitive societies.
10 A number of authors proposed general commodity standards, for example Benjamin
Graham (1937, 1944) and Frank Graham (1942). Hall (1982) proposed a commodity
standard based on a bundle of commodities that he termed the ANCAP standard (for the
commodities in the bundle: ammonium nitrate, copper, aluminum, and plywood). One of
the most unusual proposals for commodity backing of money was the brick standard of
C. O. Hardy, which is discussed at some length in Buchanan (1962).
11 For an extended exposition of the determination of the price level under the gold stan-
dard, see Barro (1979).P, the level of real economic activity, y, the opportunity cost of holding
nominally denominated assets, and possibly other factors, which we
denote by z.F or simplicity, assume that the opportunity cost of holding
nominal money balances consists solely of expected inflation, π
e, so that
the demand for money is given by
where ƒ1 < 0 (higher expected inflation reduces the demand for nominally
denominated assets). Equating the supply and demand for money, the
price level is given by
Examination of the condition for the equilibrium price level illustrates how
the price level may fluctuate under a commodity standard. Growth of real
economic activity, y, will require that the central bank expand its holdings
of the commodity or commodities that back the currency, Qm, at the same
rate the economy is growing if the price level is not to fall.
Fixity of the price q at which the central bank stands ready to buy or
sell the commodity backing the currency is the key to the interpretation of
commodity standards as rules.The most common objection to a commod-
ity standard is the resource cost of maintaining a commodity base.
12 As
economies become more financially sophisticated, it becomes possible to
replace some or even all the circulating medium with intrinsically worthless
notes and coins. Indeed, most countries followed this path as they devel-
oped. The resource cost of backing these notes and coins is still incurred
to the extent that the central bank continues to back the currency 100 per-
cent. However, the bank may hold less than 100 percent reserves as it
becomes more confident that not all currency holders are likely to try to
redeem it at the same time.
13 But in general, backing of the money stock
by real resources (that is, any λ>0) entails some cost to society.
14
This cost should be weighed against the benefit from long-term price
stability that adherence to a commodity standard may entail. Yet textbook
comparisons of commodity and fiat monies rarely mention these potential
benefits. Friedman (1986) draws attention to the real resource costs associ-
ated with the decline in long-run price predictability under fiat standards. He
cites as examples the real resources that individuals use to insulate them-
selves against future inflation (including resources spent on financial plan-
ning and the accumulation of precious metals), the real resources that went
into the development of new financial instruments to allow individuals with
small asset holdings to benefit from higher interest rates, and the real
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12 For example, Friedman (1953, 1960).
13 Under the classical gold standard, many central banks were legally required to hold
between 331/3 percent and 50 percent gold reserves. See Bordo and Eichengreen (1998).
14 By comparison, under a fiat standard the resources tied up in the currency are trivial.
During fiscal 2000, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) billed the Federal
Reserve System an average of $.045 per note. The cost to the BEP of producing a note
was $.02265. During 2000 the BEP delivered just over 9 billion notes to the Federal
Reserve System, with a face value of about $67 billion. The average cost of producing a
penny is currently $.00835, while the cost of producing other coins (nickels, dimes, and
quarters) is $.03127.Other authors compare the volatility of real activity under the gold
standard with that under the fiat standard. Conventional wisdom holds that
real activity is a lot less volatile under the postwar fiat standard than it was
under the prewar gold standard. However, the conventional wisdom has
been challenged. Comparing the pre- and postwar periods is difficult given
the poorer quality of the statistics for the prewar period. In a series of influ-
ential papers, Romer (1986a, 1986b, 1989) points out that many of the
supposed facts about the greater stability of the postwar period in the
United States were artifacts of the way data on unemployment, industrial
production, and gross national product were constructed for the prewar
period. Watson (1994) provides further evidence to support the idea that
real activity was not as volatile during the gold standard period as is com-
monly thought, showing that the apparent lengthening of business-cycle
expansions in the postwar period compared with the prewar period was
due to changes in the way the National Bureau of Economic Research
chose prewar and postwar business-cycle reference dates.
Another argument made against commodity standards is the prob-
lem of fluctuations in the price of the commodity bundle relative to prices
in general, and especially consumer prices. From a welfare perspective, it
is the latter that we want to stabilize. Hall’s ANCAP standard was devised
with this consideration in mind: The choice of commodities was based on
their correlation with the U.S. Consumer Price Index. However, this begs
the question of why stop with just five commodities; why not broaden the
basket of goods to include everything in the consumption bundle of the
average household? Doing so would bring us close to the pure price-level-
targeting variant of inflation targeting.
FIXED EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AS COMMITMENT DEVICES
Perhaps the most common rule for monetary policy in the latter half
of the twentieth century was some form of pegging or targeting of the
exchange rate. The Bretton Woods system of fixed (but adjustable)
exchange rates, which prevailed for about a quarter of a century (through
1971), delivered a modicum of stability for most countries. Following the
collapse of this system, developed and developing countries adopted a
variety of pegs. The European Monetary System (EMS)
15 was created in
1979 and evolved into Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (discussed in
more detail below). Many other countries chose to peg to the currencies of
large, low-inflation countries. By the mid-1990s, outside of Europe the dol-
lar had become the currency of choice to which to peg, due in part to the
superior inflation performance of the United States.
Exchange rate pegs have fallen from favor in recent years.The 1990s
saw a series of financial crises in countries that followed exchange rate
pegs, starting with the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in Europe in
1992–93, followed by the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997,
Brazil and Russia in 1998, and Turkey in 2000–01. Some have argued (for
example, Mishkin 1999) that a key reason for the failure of exchange rate
pegs is that in many cases, they don’t alleviate the time-consistency prob-
lem confronting monetary policymakers. Instead of providing a commit-
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15 The EMS had two key components: the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which limited
fluctuations in participants’ currencies, and the European Currency Unit (ECU), a basket
of the currencies of twelve European countries, used for setting exchange rates and
accounting within the European Union.ment mechanism that allows governments to resist the temptation to
inflate their way out of problems, exchange rate pegs exacerbate the time-
consistency problem by making central bank actions less transparent and
less accountable.The reason is that with a pegged exchange rate, the cen-
tral bank loses useful information (the daily value of the currency on the
foreign exchange markets) about the stance of monetary policy. In the
absence of a peg, the fear of depreciation may make a central bank less
likely to pursue a time-inconsistent inflationary monetary policy.
The experience of the 1990s has led many to argue that any form of
exchange rate peg short of a currency board, dollarization, or monetary
union is doomed to collapse. We now turn to these options.
CURRENCY BOARDS AND DOLLARIZATION AS EXTREME FORMS OF PEGGING
During the 1990s there was a revival of interest in the use of currency
boards as an option for creating monetary stability in developing countries.
Currency boards originated in the British colonies but fell from favor over
the course of the twentieth century. Many newly independent nations saw
currency boards as holdovers from the colonial era and replaced them 
with central banks.
16 Argentina reversed this trend in 1991 with the adop-
tion of the Convertibility Law, which tied the peso to the U.S. dollar at par-
ity through a currency board arrangement.
17 Subsequently, a number of
countries have adopted the currency board model, linking their currencies
to the Deutsche mark/euro (Estonia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina).
A currency board works much like a commodity standard. Under a
currency board, the stock of domestic money in circulation is backed by
foreign currency reserves, and the central bank or monetary authority
commits to buying or selling the domestic currency in unlimited quantities
at some pre-announced exchange rate. That is,
where λ denotes the degree to which the domestic currency is backed by
foreign currency, q denotes the exchange rate between the domestic cur-
rency and the foreign currency to which it is linked, and Qm denotes the
monetary authority’s holdings of foreign currency. Under a textbook cur-
rency board arrangement, the domestic base is fully backed by foreign
reserves, so λ = 1. However, it is not unusual for currency boards to have
less than 100 percent backing: For example, the Convertibility Law gov-
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16 See Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2000) for a review of the historical performance of
currency boards.
17 See Zarazaga (1995, 1999) for a discussion of the Argentine experience.
18 Indeed, this feature of Argentina’s currency board made it even more like the contingent
rule interpretation of the gold standard proposed by Bordo and Kydland (1995, 1997).
The reason for allowing less than complete backing of the currency with foreign reserves
was to give the Argentine central bank some leeway in responding to domestic financial
crises. In early 1995 Argentina was confronted with just such a crisis, and the central
bank responded by acting as a lender of last resort to stem the crisis.The U.S. dollar is used alongside the peso in Argentina, and some
have suggested that Argentina take the extra step of replacing the peso alto-
gether and relying only on the dollar to achieve greater price stability. The
gain in stability over that obtained under a currency board is difficult to quan-
tify but is presumably real.
19 The cost is the loss of seigniorage revenue that
the country would otherwise earn from issuing its own currency.The quanti-
tative significance of seigniorage revenue differs greatly across countries.
Fischer (1982) presents estimates that show the typical order of magnitude
of seigniorage income relative to GDP is around 1 percent, although it tends
to be somewhat higher in less-developed economies. To the extent that a
decision on the part of, say, Argentina, to dollarize increases the demand for
U.S. currency, the U.S. taxpayer would benefit in the form of increased
seigniorage revenue, and the Argentine taxpayer would lose.
20
MONETARY UNION
Dollarization is essentially an asymmetric monetary union, because
one country adopts another country’s currency as its own but does not
have any say in the management of that currency. In symmetric monetary
union, a group of countries shares a common currency and jointly man-
ages the currency. Monetary unions of either type are relatively rare. Until
recently they have typically existed between very small countries and a
larger neighbor. One of the oldest asymmetric monetary unions was that
between Belgium and Luxembourg. All the European microstates (Andorra,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City) use the currencies
of their larger neighbors. Symmetric monetary unions are even rarer. The
recent launch of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe is thus
of enormous significance: This is the first time in history that a group of
large and small sovereign nations has pooled sovereignty over money to
share and jointly manage a common currency.
21
A symmetric monetary union is at least as strong a commitment
mechanism as a currency board or dollarization and has the further advan-
tage that participating countries obtain some share of the seigniorage reve-
nue generated by the common currency along with a say in the conduct of
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ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL POLICY REVIEW FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
19 Fischer (1982) presents one of the earliest discussions of how dollarization might help
resolve the time-consistency problem in monetary policy, noting, “There is no absolutely
guaranteed way of providing discipline for governments determined to avoid it. But the
discipline imposed by use of a foreign currency is greater than that imposed by fixity of
the exchange rate, which is greater than that imposed under a flexible-rate system. This
is, therefore, a serious argument for use of a foreign money” (Fischer, 1982, 300).
20 However, Senator Connie Mack introduced a bill (S.2101) that would reimburse countries
adopting the U.S. dollar.
21 Prior to the launch of EMU, the only other symmetric monetary unions were the Eastern
Caribbean Monetary Union (ECMU) and the CFA franc zone in West Africa. The ECMU
consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and
St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The countries all use the Eastern Caribbean dollar,
which is pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate EC$4.80 = US$1. The common currency 
is managed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. (See van Beek et al. 2000 for a
review of the Eastern Caribbean Monetary Union.) The CFA franc zone consists of Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the
Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Equatorial Guinea, and Guinea-
Bissau. The CFA franc is pegged to the French franc at a rate of 100 CFA francs = 1
French franc through a currency board arrangement.monetary policy for the common currency area.The loss of monetary sov-
ereignty is less than under either a currency board arrangement or outright
dollarization, which may make symmetric monetary union a more attrac-
tive alternative. However, shifting responsibility for monetary policy from
the national to the supranational level leaves open the question of how the
central bank managing the common currency will conduct monetary policy.
One option would be to create a super currency board along the lines
of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. But this simply raises the awkward
issues about monetary sovereignty (albeit in a weaker form) once again,
except at a higher level.The challenges facing the central bank managing
the common currency of a symmetric monetary union are almost identical
to those facing the central banks managing the currencies of the larger
industrial economies. As noted at the outset, there is a consensus in the
academic literature that institutional design can alleviate the problems of
time consistency for central banks operating under a fiat standard. This is
what we consider next.
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
Why was the Bundesbank so much more successful at preserving the
purchasing power of the Deutsche mark during the fifty-odd years of its
existence than were other central banks at preserving the purchasing
power of the currencies in their care? If the institutional design of the
Bundesbank was the key contributor to price stability in Germany, that
design presumably could be implemented equally successfully in other set-
tings. But if it was something else (for example, a stronger aversion to infla-
tion on the part of the German public than elsewhere), merely copying the
Bundesbank model could not be expected to lead to equally good outcomes.
One response to the time-consistency problem is to delegate control
over monetary policy to an independent central bank and mandate that the
central bank conduct policy in a manner conducive to long-term price stabil-
ity. As noted above, a significant body of research documents a strong pos-
itive correlation between central bank independence and desirable inflation
outcomes, with no cost in terms of real performance.This has led to a global
trend toward greater central bank independence, along with, in many cases,
a clear mandate for the pursuit of price stability. Perhaps the most dramatic
recent example of this is the decision by twelve countries of the European
Union (EU) to cede control over monetary policy to the European Central
Bank (ECB).
22 The ECB enjoys an extraordinary degree of independence
from EU political authorities. The legislation governing the ECB is an inter-
national treaty rather than an act of a national parliament.
23 The treaty can
only be changed with the unanimous consent of all signatories, making
alterations very difficult. The treaty itself also guarantees the ECB’s inde-
pendence. Article 108 states:
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties con-
ferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither
the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-
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22 The twelve are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
23 The treaty was originally known as the Maastricht Treaty and was subsequently
amended by the Amsterdam Treaty. The EU publication “Selected Instruments Taken
from the Treaties” refers to the relevant treaty as the Treaty on European Union.making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institu-
tions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other
body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of
the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek
to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or
of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks.
The ECB’s ability to pursue a monetary policy focused on long-run
price stability is enhanced by the treaty provision that the ECB’s primary
objective will be price stability and that the ECB will only be required to
support other EU economic policies to the extent that doing so does not
compromise its primary objective (Article 105).These and other aspects of
the legislation governing the ECB are modeled on the legislation govern-
ing the Bundesbank, and the expectation is that with similar institutional
design the ECB will deliver as good a performance in terms of price sta-
bility as the Bundesbank did.
The adoption of an inflation-targeting strategy for monetary policy has
accompanied the trend toward greater central bank independence. Inflation
targeting originated in New Zealand in 1990 and has since been adopted by
the UK, Sweden, Canada, and several other countries.
24 Figure 2 shows the
UK’s impressive inflation performance since the adoption of inflation target-
ing. Other inflation-targeting central banks have posted comparable per-
formances during the same period. Interestingly, none of the three biggest
central banks (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan) has
adopted inflation targeting, despite significant research extolling the virtues
of this approach.
WHAT MAKES FOR A GOOD RULE?
One of the gold standard’s most important features was its trans-
parency.W hen countries were continually on the standard, it was easy to
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24 See Bernanke et al. (1999) for a good overview of inflation targeting in the past decade.
Figure 2

















NOTES: Annual (year-over-year) increase in selected measures of consumer prices in the UK. The Retail
Price Index (RPI) is the primary measure of consumer inflation in the UK. The Bank of England’s
inflation target is defined in terms of the RPI less mortgage interest costs (RPIX).
SOURCE: Haver Analytics.assess whether the promised policy was indeed being carried out. The
essence of the gold standard was that each country would define the price
of gold in terms of its currency and keep the price fixed. This involved
defining a gold coin as a fixed weight of gold, called, for example, one dollar.
Thus, in the United States during the gold standard period, one dollar was
defined to be equal to 0.04838 ounces of gold.The monetary authority was
committed to keeping the mint price of gold fixed through the purchase and
sale of gold in unlimited amounts.
A possible detraction from its transparency was the fact that the gold
standard rule was a contingent one. When a major national emergency
arose—usually a war but in a few instances a severe financial crisis—the
gold standard was suspended, supposedly as a temporary measure, on
the presumption that after the emergency had passed, the gold standard
would be resumed at its former parity after a reasonable delay. The key is
that the contingency was well understood. Britain, France, and the United
States took advantage of such suspensions during wartime. They sus-
pended specie convertibility, issued fiat currency, and sold government
bonds denominated in fiat currency. They also restored parity after the
emergency (except, of course, after World War I, when the gold standard
finally broke down).
Transparency is also a characteristic of exchange rate pegs, espe-
cially hard pegs of the currency board variety.There is abundant evidence
that currency board arrangements deliver superior inflation performance.
(See Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf 2000 for a comprehensive review.) Figure 3
shows Argentina’s inflation performance under the currency board. It is 
not difficult to argue that it is a significant improvement over what went
before.
25 Other countries employing currency board arrangements have
also done well.
The parallels between the gold standard and currency boards, while
illuminating, are incomplete.The choice of anchor currency matters: Argen-
tina would not have been as successful at controlling inflation in the 1990s
had it linked the peso to a currency that was more prone to inflation than
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25 The subsequent collapse of Argentina’s currency board in January 2002 was accompa-


















NOTE: Rate of increase in CPI for Argentina and All Items CPI-U for the United States.
SOURCES: Haver Analytics; International Financial Statistics.the U.S. dollar. Yet it would appear that the U.S. dollar should not have
been as stable a currency in the post–gold standard era as it has been.
The Federal Reserve System tends to score well in international compari-
sons of central bank independence, yet it remains a creature of Congress.
What might account for the ability of the Fed to deliver relative price sta-
bility over long periods?
It is important to remember that monetary policy cannot be divorced
from fiscal policy. For one thing, the two are intimately connected via the
government budget constraint. For example, during the heyday of the gold
standard, the sources of emergency taxation were quite limited. Hence, not
only was it natural to make the gold standard contingent on wars, one can
even argue that the gold standard was essential to protect the nation in case
of a war. At the time of the gold standard’s abandonment, however, other
sources of emergency financing had become much more plentiful, at least
in developed economies. Two examples are the taxation of human capital
(through the progressiveness of income taxes) and physical capital. The
United States relied heavily on both sources of revenue to finance World 
War II and repay the extraordinary government debt accumulated during the
war. Not all countries are in such a strong fiscal position.In nations that have
experienced severe hyperinflations, such as Germany after World War I and
several Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s, the need to finance
large budget deficits helped bring on those hyperinflations.
The benefit a country like Argentina expected to derive from anchor-
ing its currency to the dollar in part reflected a belief that the United States
is fiscally sound. Consequently, there is little likelihood that fiscal pressure
will compromise the pursuit of a stability-oriented monetary policy. For
example, all but one state (Vermont) require balanced budgets by law.
In contrast, a perennial source of difficulty in Argentina has been the
provinces’ ability and inclination to spend more than they raise in tax reve-
nues, requiring subsequent bailouts by the federal government (Zarazaga
1999).There are interesting parallels here with the institutional framework
for the ECB. To immunize the ECB from pressure to monetize debts built
up by the member states, Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 101
of the Amsterdam Treaty) prohibits the ECB from offering overdraft facili-
ties to the governments of the member states and from purchasing debt
instruments directly from them. Recognizing the importance of fiscal policy
for monetary policy, the Maastricht Treaty also requires national govern-
ments to adhere to deficit guidelines, and the Growth and Stability Pact
provides for a series of penalties if a country fails to meet these guidelines.
It is tempting to compare the gold standard rule with the less strict
targeting of either an inflation rate or a (possibly slow-growing) price level.
Because the inflation rate is simply the rate of growth of the price level, it
may seem that these two alternatives would lead to the same outcome.
This could happen if shocks to the demand for money are small. Most of
the 1990s may have been such a period. Fluctuations in real activity were
mild by historical standards. However, suppose we were to enter a period
with variation in real activity more similar in magnitude to that seen in the
1970s and 1980s. Quantitative analysis using model economies tells us
that smooth growth of the money stock would then be associated with sub-
stantial variation in the price level (and as a consequence, the inflation
rate). The central bank certainly would not be able to offset these price
fluctuations while maintaining a transparent policy. Under such circum-
stances, does it matter whether the price level itself or, alternatively, its
rate of growth (the inflation rate) is the subject of the targeting?
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transparent as the gold standard, targeting the price level, in the hands of
the right central bank, could come reasonably close. The central bank
would set a target path for the price level into the indefinite future.With real
shocks affecting the demand for money, this path would presumably
include a band of acceptable movement away from the target path (quan-
titative economic theory, combined with the history of price movements,
would suggest how wide the band should be), and the central bank would
tighten or loosen monetary policy as the boundaries of the path are
approached. (Here’s where some transparency may be lost.) As long as
the price level is brought back to the target path in the aftermath of shocks,
the outcome may resemble that under the gold standard (where gold dis-
coveries caused some fluctuation in the price level as well).
Suppose, as an example, we set the target growth rate of the price
level at 3 percent per year. Wouldn’t a target inflation rate of 3 percent
accomplish the same thing as a price-level target path? The problem is
that it’s hard to think of an operational and transparent way to carry out
inflation targeting and at the same time avoid considerable permanent drift
away from the price-level path corresponding to a 3 percent rate of in-
crease. If real shocks occur, either raising or lowering the inflation rate,
how does the central bank decide whether to tighten or loosen monetary
policy, and if so, by how much? Is it possible to define situations analogous
to those arising under price-level targeting in which nothing is done in
response to a shock because it leaves the price level sufficiently close to
the center of the target band? Can the public tell whether the announced
policy is being followed, and can the central bank thus maintain its credi-
bility?
In practice, some central banks appear to have experienced consid-
erable success with inflation targeting (New Zealand, UK, Sweden, and
others). As alluded to above, we conjecture that this apparent success is
primarily due to the benign real environment experienced in the 1990s, an
environment that has no counterpart in previous decades. What if we
again experience shocks like those in the 1970s and 1980s? Figure 4 is a
useful reminder of just how difficult were the challenges faced by monetary
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Figure 4
Real Price of Oil and Industrial Commodities, 1948–2001
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NOTES: Real price of oil is the price of West Texas Intermediate deflated by the U.S. All Items CPI-U.
Real price of industrial commodities is the Journal of Commerce industrial commodities price
index deflated by the U.S. All Items CPI-U.
SOURCE: Haver Analytics.policymakers in the 1970s and how benign the policy environment has
been in recent years. Recent oil price increases have been minor com-
pared with what the industrial world experienced in the 1970s, and com-
modity prices have also behaved in a generally favorable manner.
CONCLUSIONS
There is no obvious hierarchy of monetary regimes. Typically, mone-
tary economists draw a distinction between commodity money standards
and fiat money standards. Under a commodity standard, money consists
of or is backed by some intrinsically valuable commodity. The best known
such standard is the gold standard. Under a fiat standard, money is un-
backed.Most of the world has operated under such a standard since 1971.
However, under fiat standards countries have pursued different strategies
to stabilize the purchasing power of their currencies. One approach is to
isolate the central bank from short-term political pressures by granting it
independence. An alternative is to link the currency to a more stable one
through exchange rate pegging, a currency board, or formal dollarization.
Monetary union along the lines of EMU is an attempt to resolve the time-
consistency problem by outsourcing monetary policy to a supranational
institution. In this article we use the time-consistency perspective on opti-
mal economic policy as a framework for thinking about different monetary
regimes or constitutions. Our review of various countries’ experiences and
their varying degrees of success suggests that we may come close but will
never fully solve this problem.
The Swedish experience under the gold standard illustrates the
impossibility of tying one’s own hands completely. During the period in
which Sweden adhered to the gold standard (1873–1914), the Swedish
constitution guaranteed the convertibility into gold of banknotes issued by
the Bank of Sweden.
26 Furthermore, laws pertaining to the gold standard
could only be changed by two identical decisions of the Swedish
Parliament, with an election in between. Nevertheless, when World War I
broke out, the Bank of Sweden unilaterally decided to make its notes
inconvertible. The constitutionality of this step was never challenged, thus
ending the gold standard era in Sweden.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Warren Weber for supplying us with the data from Rolnick and
Weber (1997); Bob Formaini, Bill Gruben, Evan Koenig, and Carlos
Zarazaga for comments; and Eric Millis and Kathryn Cook for research
assistance.
REFERENCES
Alesina, Alberto, and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), “Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 25 (May): 151–62.
Banaian, King, Leroy Laney, and Thomas Willett (1983), “Central Bank Independence: An
International Comparison,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review, March, 1–13.
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1, 2002 17
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL POLICY REVIEW FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
26 See Jonung (1984).Barro, Robert J. (1979), “Money and the Price Level Under the Gold Standard,” Economic
Journal 89 (March): 13–33.
Barro, Robert J., and David B. Gordon (1983), “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a
Natural Rate Model,” Journal of Political Economy 91 (August): 589–610.
Bernanke, Ben S., Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Adam S. Posen (1999), Infla-
tion Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Blinder, A. S. (1998), Central Banking in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: MIT Press).
——— (1999), “Central Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?” NBER
Working Paper Series, no. 7161 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research,
June).
Bordo, Michael D., and Barry Eichengreen (1998), “The Rise and Fall of a Barbarous Relic:
The Role of Gold in the International Monetary System,” NBER Working Paper Series, no.
6436 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, March).
Bordo, Michael D., and Finn E. Kydland (1995), “The Gold Standard as a Rule: An Essay in
Exploration,” Explorations in Economic History 32, 423–64.
——— (1997), “The Gold Standard as a Commitment Mechanism,” in Modern Perspectives
on the Gold Standard, ed. Tamim Bayoumi, Barry Eichengreen, and Mark Taylor (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 55–100.
Buchanan, James (1962), “Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions,” in 
In Search of a Monetary Constitution, ed. Leland B.Yeager (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press), 155–83.
Calvo, Guillermo (1978), “On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary
Economy,” Econometrica 46 (November): 1411–28.
Cukierman, Alex (1992), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence: Theory and
Evidence (Cambridge: MIT Press).
DeLong, J. B. (1997), “America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s,” in Reducing Inflation:
Motivation and Strategy, ed. Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press).
Einzig, Paul (1930), Primitive Money (London: Eyre & Spotiswood).
Fischer, Stanley (1982), “Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money,” Journal of
Political Economy 90 (April): 295–313.
Friedman, Milton (1953), “Commodity-Reserve Currency,” in Essays in Positive Economics
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
——— (1960), A Program for Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham University Press).
——— (1969), “The Optimum Quantity of Money,” in The Optimum Quantity of Money and
Other Essays, ed. Milton Friedman (Chicago: Aldine), 1–50.
——— (1986), “The Resource Cost of Irredeemable Paper Money,” Journal of Political
Economy 94 (June): 642–47.
Ghosh, Atish R., Anne-Marie Gulde, and Holger C. Wolf (2000), “Currency Boards: More
Than a Quick Fix?” Economic Policy 31 (October): 269–335.
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1, 2002 18
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL POLICY REVIEW FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLASGraham, Benjamin (1937), Storage and Stability (New York: McGraw Hill).
——— (1944), World Commodities and World Currency (New York: McGraw Hill).
Graham, Frank D. (1942), Social Goals and Economic Institutions (Princeton: Princeton
University Press).
Hall, Robert E. (1982), “Explorations in the Gold Standard and Related Policies for
Stabilizing the Dollar,” in Inflation: Causes and Effects, ed. Robert E. Hall (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press).
Ireland, Peter N. (1999), “Does the Time-Consistency Problem Explain the Behavior of
Inflation in the United States?” Journal of Monetary Economics 44 (October): 279–91.
Jonung, Lars (1984), “Swedish Experience Under the Classical Gold Standard, 1873–1914,”
in A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821–1931, ed. Michael D. Bordo and
Anna J. Schwartz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 361–99.
Kydland, Finn E., and Edward C. Prescott (1977), “Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy 85 (June): 473–91.
Mishkin, Frederic S. (1999), “International Experiences with Different Monetary Policy
Regimes,” Journal of Monetary Economics 43, 579–605.
Rolnick, Arthur J., and Warren E. Weber (1997), “Money, Inflation and Output Under Fiat
and Commodity Standards,” Journal of Political Economy 105 (December): 1308–21.
Romer, Christina D. (1986a), “Is the Stabilization of the Postwar Economy a Figment of the
Data?” American Economic Review 76 (June): 314–34.
——— (1986b), “Spurious Volatility in Historical Unemployment Data,” Journal of Political
Economy 94 (February): 1–37.
——— (1989), “The Prewar Business Cycle Reconsidered: New Estimates of Gross
National Product, 1869–1908,” Journal of Political Economy 97 (February): 1–37.
Sargent, Thomas J. (1999), The Conquest of American Inflation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press).
Taylor, John B. (1997), Comment on “America’s Peacetime Inflation: The 1970s,” in
Reducing Inflation, ed. Christian D. Romer and David Romer (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press).
Van Beek, Frits, José Roberto Rosales, Mayra Zermeño, Ruby Randall, and Jorge
Shepherd (2000), “The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: Institutions, Performance, and
Policy Issues,” IMF Occasional Paper no. 195 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, August).
Watson, Mark W. (1994), “Business-Cycle Durations and Postwar Stabilization of the U.S.
Economy,” American Economic Review 84 (March): 24–46.
Zarazaga, Carlos E. J. M. (1995), “Argentina, Mexico and Currency Boards: Another Case
of Rules Versus Discretion,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review, Fourth
Quarter, 14–24.
——— (1999), “Building a Case for Currency Boards,” Pacific Economic Review 4 (June):
139–63.
VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1, 2002 19
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL POLICY REVIEW FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS